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A B S T R A C T
In a cross-country setting, we document that busy boards of directors (i.e., outside directors with multiple
directorships) enhance a bank's financing capacity by lowering its cost of debt, which is consistent with the
signalling quality hypothesis. Our analysis further reveals that this negative association is more pronounced in
conventional banks than their Islamic counterparts. Possibly owning to the distinctive governance structure and
the complexity of the Islamic business model, which requires closer monitoring, Muslim debtholders might
depreciate a busy board of directors as it is likely to associate with lower scrutinising effectiveness. Our results
provide a positive counterpoint to the negative relationship that exists between busy directors and firm per-
formance, and contributes to understanding the indispensable role busy boards play in debt financing.
1. Introduction
“Given that bank loans are the primary source of financing for most
economies, the cost of debt plays a significant role in an economy's
growth and performance”. (Chen, Filardo, He, & Zhu, 2016, p.70)
Debt contracts are reflected as a central mechanism to economic
growth because they provide a useful source to finance investments
(Daher, 2017). Like other industrial firms, outside equity and debt re-
main the two primary finance sources of banks' capital. Nevertheless,
relatively to the former source, the debt market appears to be a pre-
dominant source of financing of banks, which is evident through its
tremendous size3 and its large share in a typical bank's total assets.
Hence, banks are well-acknowledged as relatively highly leveraged and
heavily regulated as compared to non-financial firms. Given the im-
portance of debt finance to the banking industry, it is worthy of special
attention from academic researchers and practitioners.
Conventionally adhered to the agency theory, interest conflicts
among the three parties comprising of directors, shareholders, and
debtholders are inevitable (Chakravarty & Rutherford, 2017). Particu-
larly, shareholders of high-leveraged institutions, including banks often
have a strong incentive to expropriate wealth from debtholders through
investing in risky projects (Fields, Fraser, & Subrahmanyam, 2012).
Debtholders may anticipate these incentives, and thus, require greater
risk premium (returns) on their capital, leading to a higher cost of debt
(see Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Creating a
high-quality board of directors (BOD hereafter) to scrutinise bank ac-
tivities and investments on behalf of debtholders is a fundamental so-
lution for such conflict of interest.
Numerous existing studies (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004;
Fields et al., 2012) have focused on the linkage between quantifiable
measures of the management quality (i.e., corporate governance and
board attributes) and various corporate outcomes such as cost of debt,
equity return, and firm value. Some of them demonstrate the effect of
the BOD characteristics on the cost of debt financing in non-financial
firms (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Lorca, Sánchez-Ballesta, & García-
Meca, 2011; Piot & Missonier-Piera, 2009). They generally claim that
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101472
Received 3 September 2019; Received in revised form 24 February 2020; Accepted 26 February 2020
⁎ Corresponding author at: Huddersfield Business School, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH, United Kingdom.
E-mail addresses: trinhquangvu1990@gmail.com, Q.Trinh@hud.ac.uk (V.Q. Trinh), Abjuqhaiman@kfu.edu.sa (A.A. Aljughaiman),
N.d.cao@bath.ac.uk (N.D. Cao).
1 Postal address: Al-Ahsaa 31,982, KSA
2 Postal address: Claverton road, Bath, BA 2 7AY, UK.
3 A part of this research was done in Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom.
‡ Statistics of Bank for International Settlements (2017) show that at the end of the first quarter of 2017, the global debt securities outstanding reached to 21,749
billion of US dollars; among this, international debt securities outstanding of banks (6427 billion of US dollars) are double than that of non-financial firms (3261
billion of US dollars).
International Review of Financial Analysis 69 (2020) 101472
Available online 29 February 2020
1057-5219/ © 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
T
debtholders favour strong monitoring mechanisms, which tend to limit
managerial opportunism. Thus, the quality of governance mechanisms
can be considered as a channel, which may reduce creditors' risk, and
therefore, debtholders might become more lenient in the way the risk
premium is set. In other words, the increased monitoring effectiveness
of the board toward the management team and CEO as a default risk-
reduction corporate governance mechanism may benefit the debt-
holders as it aligns the interest conflicts between them and agents. This
raises the high probability that the bank can meet the interest of the
creditors and principal payment obligations.
Although those studies help understand the impacts of management
quality on different corporate outcomes, the research is still limited
within the contexts of busy boards and cost of debts. As delegated
monitors, outside directors are charged with legal roles and account-
abilities offering effective oversight over executives or managers such
that conflicts of interest between creditors, shareholders and managers
are minimised. Debtholders, therefore, can benefit from outside direc-
tors' effective scrutinising through mitigation in agency problems such
as shirking, perquisite consumption, and overinvestment (Trinh,
Elnahass, Salama, & Izzeldin, 2019). Such decreased agency cost, to-
gether with the reduction in information asymmetry, can mitigate the
cost of debt financing (Chen & King, 2014).
The existing literature studying cost of debt usually excludes banks
from their samples, except for Penas and Unal (2004), Deng, Elyasiani,
and Mao (2007), Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao (2017). However, those
banking studies concentrate solely on the association between the
borrowing rate and non-governance aspects such as diversification (i.e.,
geographic, assets and non-traditional activities) (e.g., Deng et al.,
2007; Deng et al., 2017). Therefore, based on our review of literature,
the association between the BOD busyness and cost of debt remains
undiscovered, specifically for financial firms.
As discussed earlier, debt financing is considered as the main source
of funds in the banking industry. Thus, banks need to assure the
achievement of an effective management to their debt terms. A highly
qualified board in the banks can achieve this important goal. Fields
et al. (2012) argue that the quality of the board might contribute to
influence on the cost of debt capital. Taking in consideration the sig-
nificant influence of busy board on the board quality, it is important to
investigage the busy board in the context of banking industry. A board
that is characterised as busy may affect the board quality positively
through their experience and knowledge. This may lead to greater
monitoring and better quality advice to the management, which may
mitigate the banks cost of debt.
Accordingly, our study extends the cross-country banking literature
by answering the following important question: Does busy BOD reduce
the cost of debt in the banking sector? The study brings critical values
since debt financing is one of the crucial capital sources for bank op-
erations (leveraged), and we are one of the first to look at this specific
research question. While many prior studies show a negative effect of
board busyness and firm performance, which is considered as proble-
matic for the companies' shareholders (e.g., Cashman, Gillan, & Jun,
2012; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006), there is very limited evidence showing
that whether lenders prefer a firm's board busyness or not (except for
Chakravarty & Rutherford, 2017).
Furthermore, since our sample covers countries that use dual banking
operating systems (Conventional and Islamic), special attention has been
paid to Islamic banks. Our focus on these two bank types is crucial under
the on-going debate about the resilience and stability of the Islamic banks.
Some researchers cast doubt on the long-run performance and risk-taking
of Islamic banks and underpin the need for further investigations for their
governance structure and board efficacy (e.g., Abdelsalam, Dimitropoulos,
Elnahass, & Leventis, 2016; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013;
Čihák & Hesse, 2010). While conventional banks operate within the tra-
ditional interest-based framework, their Islamic counterparts refer to a
banking system that operates under risk-sharing base. Specifically, Islamic
banks must follow several Shari'ah principles that distinct their operating
system and have its own multi-layer governance system (Mollah & Zaman,
2015).4 BODs and managers in Islamic banks are required to adhere to
Islamic principles of Shari'ah in fulfilling their missions to maximise
shareholders' wealth. The stakeholders' interests in this bank type might
extend beyond the financial interest to involve ethical and religious va-
lues/needs (Alnasser & Muhammed, 2012). The failure to meet those ex-
pectations by the board and managers creates an extra source of agency
problems. Given these differences between conventional and Islamic
banks, this paper is inspired by the demand to recognise the differences in
busy board influences between two bank types. We argue that the need for
monitoring of a BOD toward managers in Islamic banks tends to be higher
than that in their conventional counterparts, leading to dissimilar effects of
BOD busyness on cost of debt. We also believe that a comparative in-
vestigation of BOD busyness across two different bank types, Islamic and
conventional banks, is particularly important to on-going debate on in-
fluences of board busyness on financial indicators when levels of agency
and monitoring demands are different. This, in turn, can improve our
understanding of busy directors' role in unique bank governance. There-
fore, we next aim to investigate whether the distinct features of Islamic
banks alter the relationship between the cost of debt and busy board.
Our second research question is set upon on the argument that busy
directors appear to have differential effects on bank performance de-
pending on the level of agency conflicts related to the corporate operations
(Trinh et al., 2019). Considering the monitoring and advising roles of di-
rectors, the value of holding multiple directorships depends ultimately on
the relative importance of effective oversight, and the governance attri-
butes. If the need for scrutinising is vital for certain types of firms, because
of the greater business-process complexities and uniqueness of agency
problems, the monitoring role of independent directors is relatively more
important than their resource function. To investigate the distinct effects
of board busyness on the cost of debt conditional on banks' institutional
characteristics and business models, we evaluate such issue across two
global banking systems: Islamic and conventional banks.
The data focuses on publicly traded commercial banks over the
estimated period of 2010–2015. Several interesting results are ob-
tained. First, we find a negative association between the banks' cost of
public debt and a busy BOD on our full sample. This confirms our main
hypothesis that busy BOD significantly reduces the cost of debt in
banking sector. Second, the opposite signs of coefficients of interaction
terms between busy boards and Islamic bank dummy factor suggest that
the negative relationship between the cost of debt and a busy board is
lessened for Islamic banking. In other words, by conditional on the bank
types, we find that Islamic banks having busy outside directors are less
likely to enjoy lower cost of debt comparing to their conventional
counterparts. However, we find a non-linear relationship between busy
BOD and cost of debt for conventional bank subsample, which is not
significant in Islamic bank subsample. Our results are robust across
different board busyness measures and various model specifications.
Our findings contribute to the line of research that focuses on the
relationship between board attributes and the cost of debt (e.g.,
Chakravarty & Rutherford, 2017; Lorca et al., 2011); and also com-
plement comparative governance literature underpinning the Islamic -
conventional banking paradigm (e.g., Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Mollah,
Hassan, Al Farooque, & Mobarek, 20175; Trinh et al., 2019) by in-
vestigating the impact of the board busyness on a bank's borrowing
rates from an international perspective. For previous studies, while
§ To be compliant with Sharia'ah Principles, Islamic banks are not allowed to
charge interest on money, take excessive risks, invest in harmful activities (e.g.,
gambling, alcohol,), and their transaction must be based on real economic as-
sets. Islamic banks financial instruments must be based on profit-losses sharing
contracts.
** Mollah and Zaman (2015) examines a specific character of SSB (i.e. the
board size of SSB) and its influence on bank performance. Mollah et al. (2017),
investigates the relation between general corporate governance structures, via a
developed index, and bank risk-taking across the two bank types.
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Mollah and Zaman (2015) examine a specific character of Shari'ah
board (i.e. the board size) and its influence on bank performance,
Mollah et al. (2017) continue investigating the relation between general
corporate governance structures, via a developed index, and bank risk-
taking across the two bank types. More recently, Trinh et al. (2019) and
Elnahass, Omoteso, Salama, and Trinh (2019) have contributed to
Mollah papers by testing the effect of board busyness (both BOD and
Shari'ah board) on bank performance, risk-taking behaviour and market
valuations. However, all these studies consider general corporate gov-
ernance and/or busyness effects under the views of investors and banks.
Our paper has therefore incrementally contributed to existing corporate
governance research in Islamic and conventional banking system by
comparatively evaluating board busyness function in a linkage with
lenders or debtholders. This ends up with a consideration of bank cost
of debt and board busyness within the specific context of those both
bank types.
Furthermore, although Islamic banks are prohibited from paying an
interest rate to their debtholders, they still pay an expected profit rate
comparable to interest rates on other savings accounts. In this study, we
also contribute to the method of measuring the cost of debt. While most
of the existing studies on the cost of debt mostly focused on interest
rates when measuring a firm's cost of debt (e.g. Chen & King, 2014;
Cremers, Nair, & Wei, 2007; Kisgen & Strahan, 2010; Klock, Mansi, &
Maxwell, 2005; Reeb, Mansi, & Allee, 2001), this research uses a new
alternative metrics: after-tax weighted average cost of debt (ATWACD).
We argue that a bank often uses various sources, including either short-
or long-term debt, to finance their activities; therefore, using only in-
terest rates as the cost of debt appears to fail in reflecting the lending
price of a bank fully and accurately. ATWACD hence is more appro-
priate because of its strong representation in either long-term or short-
term debt. More importantly, our new measure is particularly useful in
estimating the relative cost of debt of Islamic banks, which are known
as interest-free businesses. Through this proxy for the cost of debt,
analysis can reasonably evaluate whether and how debtholders value
the busy boards of directors, especially those in the interest-free fi-
nancial system like Islamic banks.
The next section reviews the literature on the motivations for busy
directors and the link between them and the cost of debt; and then sets
the tested hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and database
sources, and the methodology. Section 4 reports the descriptive statis-
tics. Section 5 presents the empirical results, which is followed by ad-
ditional testing and robustness checks (Section 6). Section 7 presents a
conclusion.
2. Research background and empirical predictions
2.1. Sources of busy directors' benefit: Reduction in the cost of debt
An effective bank BOD is one of the crucial components of strong
firm governance, especially after recent financial turmoil. Nevertheless,
the governing bodies of the BOD appear to provide limited regulation
regarding specific guidance on how BOD members are anticipated to
execute their role. Furthermore, the BOD functioning (e.g. BOD size,
independence, directorships) is in general open to interpretation. For
instance, the common question that if larger (or smaller), diverse (or
uniform), and highly independent (or low independent) BOD within
banks is more effective are still vague (e.g., Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015).
Similarly, findings from present works are also equivocal with regards
to the true nature of the actual role of busy directors (those are sitting in
several for-profit firms' boards) on bank financial decisions (Elnahass
et al., 2019). Advocates support that the rich sources brought by busy
directors are beneficial to banks whilst opponents provide detrimental
evidence.
Corporate finance theorists assert that the value of a firm/bank is
the present value of future cash flows (CFs) (Chen & King, 2014). Thus,
the effects of busy BOD on bank value can be from at least two sources:
the impact on the CFs stream and/or the effect on the cost of capital
that future CFs are discounted. As highlighted by Easley and O'Hara
(2004), the fundamental in firm policies is the cost of capital due to its
influence on profitability, and thereby investment decisions.
Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017) is a notable recent work providing
empirical evidence for non-financial firms in a single country (US)
through a hostile takeover framework that board busyness contributes
to the reduced cost of debt. However, the association of busy boards
and the cost of debt, particularly in the banking industry, within pre-
vious research is still unanswered. Our study is different to Chakravarty
and Rutherford by three-fold. First, we conduct a study on a global basis
while their study is a single-country research. Second, we explore BOD
busyness-cost of debt nexus in the context of banking. It is important to
investigate such association in this sector as banks characteristics and
business models are different from non-financial firms. Particularly,
banks have high leverage level, encounter contagion risk in the in-
dustry, work in a significantly regulated environment, and have im-
portant impacts on the real economy (Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015). Fur-
thermore, the banking industry is subject to unique agency costs that
are different from the conventional agency problems (Safieddine,
2009). These different agency costs might distinguish the influence of
busy board on the cost of debt in the banking industry. Consequently,
we have addressed the lacking attention paid to the busy board of
banks. Third, our study takes a step further to conduct a comparison
research between two alternative banking models: conventional and
Islamic banks.
Existing corporate theories advise a close and important BOD bu-
syness-borrowing costs nexus. In general, the theoretical foundation for
the association between busy board and cost of debt could be driven
from the managerial power theory (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Bebchuk,
Fried, & Walker, 2002). This is consistent with Pathan, Wong, and
Benson (2019), who discuss that this theory recognises the important
monitoring role that provided by the independent director. According
to the managerial power theory, a firm with poor monitoring allow
managers to acquire stronger power to benefit their interests that is
relative related to the firm performance (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk
& Fried, 2004). This might give incentive to managers to take higher
risk level, which maximise the shareholder wealth, on the expense of
debt holders. In addition, Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983) argue
that a busy board that have a number of director memberships, can be
an indication of his reputation as an effective monitoring of corporate
managers. Taking together, the managerial power theory with this
positive view, we can theoretically expect a negative relationship be-
tween busy board and cost of debt.
In term of empirical research, we thoroughly discuss below three
main channels for how busy BODs could affect the bank cost of debt and
develop the hypotheses accordingly.
Our first arguable channel is related to weaker shareholder control.
Weaker shareholders control could be created by having busy outside
directors. The rationale is that directors held additional directorship
appointments tend to weaken shareholder control as they pursue con-
servation of their directorship reputation through a possible channel:
putting anti-takeover provisions in place (Chakravarty & Rutherford,
2017). A study by Cremers et al. (2007) suggests that not all board
characteristics have the same influence on debtholders as they have on
shareholders. For instance, shareholders prefer a strong shareholder
control to maximise their wealth, while weak shareholder control is
strongly desired by the debtholders to minimise the asset substitution
problem. Thus, given such shareholder control-weakening behaviour of
busy outside directors' appeals to creditors, the benefits brought by
those busy BODs are expected to outweigh the distraction risk to the
bank stability (e.g. Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011). This makes the
lenders perceive busy boards positively, which may signal their pre-
ference by providing loans to firms at preferential rates (e.g. Cremers
et al., 2007; Klock et al., 2005; Shivdasani, 1993). This supports a po-
sitive view that the number of other jobs holds by a “busy” directors
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may serve as a measure of his/her reputation as an effective monitor of
corporate managers (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983), which di-
minishes managerial opportunism and mismanagement and hence,
lower the cost of debt capital (Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008; Reeb et al.,
2001). Furthermore, companies which protect their outside directors
from a potential lawsuit, and hence allow these directors to pursue their
self-interest at the expenses of shareholders, might enjoy a lower cost of
debt (Bradley & Chen, 2011). Bradley and Chen (2011) also ascribe the
association between the firm cost of debt and busy directors to the
weaker shareholder control mechanism, because weaker shareholder
control mitigates the asset substitution risk.
Another argument that describes the association between the busy
board and the cost of debt is through the insolvency risk channel. Trinh
et al. (2019) find an inverse relationship between insolvency risks and
busy outside directors within banks. Specifically, the probability of
insolvency is considerably greater when BODs fail to fulfil their legal
responsibilities. Because multiple directorships help enhance outside
directors' ability, experience and networking to provide better advising
and monitoring services for banks, insolvency risk is reduced. In par-
ticular, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) find that busyness of directors
improves their performance and consequently lowers the expected cost
of financial distress. Wider networking of busy BOD directors helps
banks to easier find good sources for financing investments, leading to a
reduction in the cost of borrowing. We hypothesise that busy BODs
should be associated with a lower cost of debt. We further argue that
the busyness of directors leads to a higher reduction on the cost of debt
for banks with a higher insolvency risk. Banks with higher bankruptcy
risk-benefit most from busy outside directors due to their higher
probability and costs of financial distress. In contrast, banks with little
bankruptcy risk-benefit least from busy directors due to their unlikely
default.
In a similar vein, companies with risky debt tend to forgo positive
net present value investments if most value of the investment does to-
ward the debtholders as poor states arise (Myers, 1977). Busy BODs can
enhance the bank board advising and monitoring effectiveness through
a decline of the probability of the poor states arising. Thereby, owners
may have higher incentives as well as the confidence to invest their
capital into potential value-enhancing projects (Elyasiani & Zhang,
2015). In other words, BOD busyness may lead the board following the
optimal investment policy through making sufficient internal resources
and enjoying a low cost of capital and hence, curtails the under-
investment problem when a bank has growth opportunities and a
greater cost of external financing. In our particular case, banks having
busy BODs may have a lower probability of the poor states occurring,
and consequently, they should be the preference of the creditors. Based
on the above, we reasonably contend that busy BODs should lead to a
lower cost of debt by increasing the board effectiveness and mitigating
the underinvestment problems.
To sum up, our previous arguments indicate that effective BOD
(e.g., busy board) can achieve high quality of management practices.
Intuition contends that higher quality of management practices might
fetch better deals from debtholders. Because BOD is a crucial input in
the bank operating process, higher quality of BOD (better input) might
lead to more efficient operations and thereby lower the bank underlying
business risk. This, consequently, might relax the terms of credit the
banks could get from their debtholders (Rahaman & Al Zaman, 2013).
The simple economic framework adopted by Rahaman and Al Zaman
(2013) can illustrate why the BOD management quality may sub-
stantially influence a bank's borrowing cost via three points. First, al-
though debtholders cannot observe the intrinsic quality of a bank, the
high-quality bank could always formulate costly signalling mechan-
isms/devices to fetch better deals from debtholders. The signal can be
motivated in terms of reputational capital (Diamond, 1989) or re-
lationship lending (Boot & Thakor, 1994) or by adopting better quality
of management practices (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007). All these mo-
tivations could be obtained from the multiple directorships of the
directors. Second, debtholders may not have sufficient motivation to
fully scrutinise the bank-quality spectrum because large debtholders
could always diversify away borrower-specific risks in their loan port-
folios. Therefore, signalling by banks rather than monitoring by debt-
holders could be a better channel to understand the interaction between
board quality and debt contract terms. Third, the benefit from signals
(adopting costly managerial practices) may not be sufficiently high for
debtholders although those management quality practices enhance the
firm total value (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007). It is therefore important
to note that as long as signals from busy BODs are costly and benefits
from signalling are sufficiently high, we should observe heterogeneity
in BOD busyness across banks, and the variation in multiple director-
ships of BODs should also be correlated with the heterogeneity in the
bank's cost of debt. This argument is in line with Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007) who provide agency explanations of why poorly-managed firms
exist.
Taken together, we hypothesise that board busyness is likely to
reduce the bank cost of debt. Accordingly, we set our first hypothesis in
the alternative forms:
H1. : Banks with busy boards exhibits lower cost of debt than banks
with non-busy boards.
2.2. Director busyness and the cost of debt: The matter of bank type
Islamic banks differ primarily from conventional banks regarding
the additional layer of governance of the former, which aims to over-
look banks' religious affairs. Particularly, the latter has no concerns on
any religious matters whilst the former are required to conduct its ac-
tivities in compliance with Islamic laws. In details, Islamic banks have
to follow Shari'ah principles, which (1) prohibits payments or receive of
interest on the debts (Riba), (2) relay on risk-sharing bases instead of
risk-shifting for all financial transactions, (3) prohibits excessive risks
and a certain type of investment activities (e.g., Alcoholic). To comply
with these principles, the nature of Islamic banks' liability side (e.g.,
financial contracts) has to be different from their counterparties (con-
ventional banks). Even though interest in lending is prohibited in Islam,
some of their transaction could be categorized as debt-based financing
(Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013). In these financing contracts, the
financer buys or ask to construct the underlying assets then sell it to the
client using the deferred-payment basis with one or several instalments.
Another financing source that Islamic banks rely on is investment or
saving accounts, which generates a return based on agreed profit rates.
Abedifar et al. (2013) argue that the payoff to investment account
holders in Islamic banks dependents on the bank's performance and
depositor's religiosity. Religious depositors might accept lower return
(cost of debt for Islamic banks) if the bank assures their compliance
with Shari'ah principles even if the bank's performance is poor.
Therefore, their depositors might care more about the ethical and re-
ligious issues in the banks. In contrast, religious depositors might be
risk-averse and demanding higher return if the bank showing a risky
behaviour (Abedifar et al., 2013). Thus, the Islamic banks' cost of debt
can be affected negatively.
Given the unique characterises of Islamic banks and the additional
restrictions in their business models, their BODs might encounter
complicated and more responsibilities that need to be achieved (e.g.,
compliant with Shari'ah principles). Aljughaiman and Salama (2019)
discuss that the BOD responsibilities to comply with Shari'ah principles
might lead to more constraints on their ability to monitor and advice
management and manage risk, which might lead to differential impacts
on their risk-taking behaviour. Thus, the differences in agency relations
between Islamic and conventional banks can produce a different re-
lationship between busy boards and cost of debt. Furthermore, board
members are not Shari'ah scholars, and thus not able to confirm the
bank's compliance with Shari'ah principles. Therefore, Islamic banks'
debtholders may not appreciate the busy board, and thus not have a
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strong influence on the cost of the fund they provide to the bank.
In this study, we hypothesise that conventional banks employing
busy BOD may enjoy lower cost of debt than Islamic banks with busy
BOD. This is well explained by the finding of Trinh et al. (2019) which
find that busy BODs in Islamic banks show detrimental effects on bank
financial stability while those in conventional banks still bring re-
putational benefits such as networking and experience to the firms. This
leads us to the second hypothesis as below:
H2. Conventional Banks with busy boards exhibit lower cost of debt than
Islamic banks with busy boards.
3. Data and research method
3.1. Data collection and sample
To test our hypotheses, we employ several sources including the
Thomson One Reuters DataStream, Bankscope, annual bank reports,
and World Bank database.6 We focus on a mixed sample of Islamic and
conventional banks listed on stock markets from 2010 to 2015. This
estimated period allows us to avoid the potential effect of the crisis
shock of 2007–2009 that banks encountered. We started with an initial
sample of 3038 banks (196 Islamic banks and 2842 conventional banks)
operating cross 36 countries. We then dropped any bank that have
headquartered in the countries having only Islamic or conventional
banks and having less than two listed banks; dropped any other banks
which do not have official websites and accounting period from 01 of
January to 31 of December; excluded full investment banks and con-
ventional banks with Islamic window (i.e., conventional banks with
separate Islamic banking department with a supervision of Shari'ah
board); and finally we do not include banks which have less than three
consecutive year's full data availability. Our criteria are in line with the
study of Elnahass et al. (2019) and other previous banking literature
such as Mollah et al. (2017).
Our ultimate dataset includes 386 firm-year observations (70 pub-
licly quoted commercial banks operating in 11 countries). We report the
sample distribution by country and bank in Table 1: 43 conventional
banks (236 observations) and 27 Islamic banks (150 observations). We
assume that the differences in Islamic banking models across countries
due to various country-specific regulations do not exist.
3.2. Research method
3.2.1. Measuring agency cost of debt
The primary dependent variable of our analysis is the bank cost of
debt. We measure this by the after-tax weighted average cost of debt for
the security, which is available in Bloomberg database. It is calculated
by using government bond rates, a debt adjustment factor (DAF), the
proportions of short-term and long-term debt to total debt, and the
stock's effective tax rate. The debt adjustment factor represents the
average yield above government bonds for a given rating class. The
lower the rating, the higher the adjustment factor. The DAF is only
employed when a bank does not have a fair market curve. When a bank
does not have a credit rating, an assumed rate of 1.38 (the equivalent
rate of a BBB+ Standard & Poor's long-term currency issuer rating) is
employed. The exact calculation of DAF is as follows:
= +Cost of Debt [[(SD/TD) (CS AF)] [(LD/TD) (CL AF)]]
[1 TR]
where: SD is Short-term Debt. TD is total debt. CS is Pre-Tax Cost of
Short-term Debt. AF is Debt Adjustment Factor. LD is Long-term Debt.
CL is Pre-Tax Cost of Long-term Debt.7 TR is Effective Tax Rate. Our
measure is useful in estimating the relative cost of debt of Islamic
banks, which are known as interest-free businesses. Accordingly, tra-
ditional interest rates are replaced by an equation, including govern-
ment bond rates (short-term and long-term debt) that both banking
models can employ to finance for their operations.
3.2.2. Measuring the busyness of boards of directors
A busy director is defined as an individual who serves in at least two
outside firms. This definition is similarly employed in previous banking
studies such as Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and Trinh et al. (2019).
Based on this, two measures of busy board of directors (BBOD) are used.
The first measure is the ratio of outside directorships per outside director
(ABOD), representing the average number of other outside board seats
held by each outside director. It is computed as the total number of
additional (outside) boards occupied by outside directors divided by the
number of outside directors on the board (Ferris, Jagannathan, &
Pritchard, 2003). The second measure is the percentage of busy outside
directors (%BBOD), which is calculated as the number of outside di-
rectors serving on two or more additional (outside) firms divided by the
number of outside directors on the board.8
3.2.3. Empirical models
To examine our hypotheses, we employ the traditional ordinary
least square (OLS) with robust standard error approach. Accordingly,
we present the main equations model as follows:
= + + ++ + +Cost of Debt BBOD ISLAMIC BBODISLAMIC P µYear effectsit it it itit it0 1 2 3 (1)
where, Cost of Debtitrepresents the bank cost of debt; BBODit represents
{ABOD; % BBOD}; ISLAMICit represents the Islamic bank dummy
variable, taking a value of 1 if the observed bank is classified as Islamic,
otherwise 0; BBODit ∗ ISLAMICit is the interaction term between busy
BOD and ISLAMIC dummy factor, which is used to control for the
mediating effects of the two different bank types; ϕP is a vector of
control variables in the cost of debt model.
Following prior studies (e.g., Chakravarty & Rutherford, 2017;
Fields et al., 2012; Lorca et al., 2011), we control for board as well as
firm-level and country-level characteristics in our multivariate regres-
sions to limit potential omitted variables bias. Those are widely em-
ployed in the previous cost of debt literature, which captures factors
affecting the bank borrowing rate. We first include a set of bank gov-
ernance characteristics such as board size (LogBSIZE) and board in-
dependence (%INDEP) and CEO duality (DUAL). The former is mea-
sured by the number of directors on the board while the latter is
measured by the percentage of outside non-executive directors on the
board. The final is calculated as the dummy variable, which takes the
value of one if the chair and CEO is the same person, otherwise, zero.
We next control for bank and country-specific variables consisting of
bank size (LogTA), bank leverage (LEV), GDP per capital (GDPCAPITA),
†† Consolidated bank accounting and market data were drawn from
Datastream and Bankscope database. We manually collect corporate govern-
ance data (i.e. information of independent non-executive directors and the
board of directors) from annual reports. We define a director as busy if he/she
holds at least three directorships or two outside/additional directorships. We
count the number of directorships held by directors in all for-profit private and
public firms, consistent with previous studies (Chakravarty & Rutherford, 2017;
Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Trinh et al., 2019). And finally, we collect macro-
economics indicators from the World Bank database.
‡‡ In the case of Islamic bank, the cost of long-term debt is the return rate that
the investment account holders receive from the bank.
§§ Due to limited data for Islamic banking, we are unable to distinguish be-
tween other types of directorships or activities of the director. We understand
that this may be the limitation of the proxy of busyness, but this is consistent
with previous studies in the field such as Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and Trinh
et al. (2019). In addition, in line with their studies, we have included only paid
jobs, which affect significantly directors' time and monitoring ability. In other
words, we do not include voluntary jobs.
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Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and average index of country
governance (GOV_COUNTRY). Table 2 contains a complete list of
variable names and definitions/calculations.
4. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in all esti-
mated models, which includes the cost of debt, busy board of directors,
governance attributes, and other control firm-specific and country-
specific variables. Our sample of 386 firm-years shows that the average
and median cost of debt (Cost of Debt) are around 2.281% and 1.394%.
Our t-test proves that the cost of debt of conventional banks - CBs
(2.878%) is significantly higher than that of Islamic banks - IBs
(1.343%).
As for the board governance structure and board busyness, we find
that, on average, the board of directors for the whole sample (IBs, CBs)
composed of slightly fewer than 10 directors (11, 9) (BSIZE), which is
consistent with the average number of directors on board in the study of
Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017). An average director in our esti-
mated sample holds about two outside directorship seats (ABOD),
which is also similar to other previous research (Cashman et al., 2012;
Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). This number is
higher in CBs (2.374) compared to IBs (2.071); however, the t-test
Table 1
Final sample distributions for the whole sample period.




% (IBs) % (CBs) % (Full Sample)
Bahrain 30 30 60 20.00 12.71 15.54
Bangladesh 36 44 80 24.00 18.64 20.73
Egypt 3 9 12 2.00 3.81 3.11
Indonesia 6 66 72 4.00 27.97 18.65
Jordan 12 29 41 8.00 12.29 10.62
Kuwait 3 12 15 2.00 5.09 3.89
Pakistan 24 6 30 16.00 2.54 7.77
Qatar 18 24 42 12.00 10.17 10.88
Saudi Arabia 6 6 12 4.00 2.54 3.11
UAE 6 6 12 4.00 2.54 3.11
Oman 6 4 10 4.00 1.70 2.59
Total bank-year observations 150 236 386 100 100 100
Number of banks 27 43 70 – – –
Notes: The ultimate sample includes 70 listed banks (386 bank-year observations) with 27 IBs (150 bank-year observations) and 43 CBs (236 bank-year observations)
for a six-year period from 2010. These banks are operating in 11 dual-banking countries.
Table 2
Variable definitions and sources.
Variables Abbreviations Definitions
Cost of debt Cost of Debt After-tax weighted average cost of debt for the security. It is calculated by using government bond rates, a debt
adjustment factor (DAF), the proportions of short-term and long-term debt to total debt, and the stock's effective tax
rate. The debt adjustment factor represents the average yield above government bonds for a given rating class. Source:
Bloomberg
# Average directorships of directors ABOD Average outside directorships per independent director, calculated as total number of additional (outside) boards held
by independent directors divided by number of independent directors on the board. Source: annual report
% Busy directors %BBOD Percentage of busy independent directors on the board (%), calculated as number of independent directors serving on
two or more additional (outside) firms divided by number of independent directors on the board. Source: annual report
Board of Directors Size LogBSIZE Natural logarithm of the total number of board of directors' members. Source: annual report
Board Independence %IND Percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors. Source: annual report
Chair-CEO duality DUAL Dummy variable which takes value of one if the chair and CEO is the same person and zero otherwise. Source: annual
report
Bank size LogTA Natural logarithm of the total assets. Source: DataStream
Bank leverage LEV Total debt to total equity. Source: DataStream
GDP per capita GDPCAPITA Natural logarithm of Gross domestic products per capita. Source: World Bank
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index
HHI The square of the sum of the ratio of total assets of each firm-year to total assets of all banks each year. Its range is from
0 to 1. Source: Bankscope
Average country governance index GOV_COUNTRY The average value of six individual country governance measures including the corruption, government effectiveness,
political stability, and regulatory quality, the rule of law, and voice and accountability. Source: World Bank
Islamic banking dummy ISLAMIC Dummy variable, taking value of one if the observed firm is classified as Islamic banks, otherwise zero. Source:
Bankscope, annual report, and Central Bank's website of each country.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean Median Std. Min Max
Cost of Debt 386 2.281 1.394 2.532 0 10.320
ABOD 386 2.257 1.8 2.046 0 11
%BBOD 386 0.479 0.5 0.377 0 1
BSIZE 386 9.544 9 3.705 3 25
%IND 386 0.348 0.333 0.237 0 1
DUAL 386 0.039 0 0.194 0 1
%INDQ 383 0.190 0 0.276 0 1
%INDEXP 386 0.294 0.2 0.339 0 1
LogASIZE 380 3.724 3 0.925 2 6
%BAC 380 0.495 0.5 0.333 0 1
INDMET 310 7.769 6 5.006 0 35
LogTA 386 15.408 15.427 1.287 11.999 18.047
LEV 386 8.039 7.775 3.774 −4.210 19.998
HHI 386 0.142 0.109 0.095 0.058 0.672
GDPCAPITA 386 8.750 8.216 1.542 6.634 11.480
GOV_COUNTRY 386 −0.286 −0.212 0.526 −1.181 0.737
ISLAMIC 386 0.389 0 0.488 0 1
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics of all variables employed in the
main regression models of the study for the full sample. The ***, **, * re-
presents p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. See Table 2 and Section 6.1 for other
variable definitions.
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indicates an insignificant difference between the two subsamples.
Busy directors make up about 47.9% of a board of directors (%
BBOD), 43.4% of an IB board and 50.85% of a CB board. We find that
the percentage of busy directors on board in CBs is higher than that in
IBs, showing that board of directors in listed CBs appears to be busier
than the board in listed IBs, supported by the result of two-sample t-test.
In addition, we find that the percentage of independent directors (%
INDEP) on the board for the full sample (IBs, CBs) averagely is 35%
(33%, 36%).
Table 4 shows the results of the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix
for the main independent variables in our sample. We find that corre-
lations among explanatory variables are within acceptable limits and
raise no serious concerns on multicollinearity.
5. Empirical findings
5.1. Busy board of directors and the cost of debt
In Table 5 (Models 1 and 2), we show how the bank cost of debt is
impacted when a bank adds an additional busy outside director to the
board. We find that busy board of directors tends to reduce the bank
cost of debt across two alternative proxy measures of board busyness
(ABOD and %BBOD), after controlling for other board composition,
firm-level and country-level characteristics. This finding is consistent
with Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017), in their assertion that lenders
recognise banks with busy independent directors as safer investments
and are therefore willing to lend their capital at a lower interest rate.
Additional studies show the similar concept include Shivdasani (1993),
Klock et al. (2005), Cremers et al. (2007), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015),
and so on.
Economically, the coefficient of average directorships of outside
directors suggests that for every additional directorship added to the
board, the cost of debt is reduced by about 0.353%. In addition, the cost
of debt for banks whose board increases 1% of busy outside directors is
reduced by about 1.623%. Based on these results, we conclude that
board busyness has a negative and statistically significant impact on
banks’ cost of debt, thus supporting our first hypothesis. Overall find-
ings are consistent with our expectations that busy BODs tend to bring
their reputational benefits to their banks (see Elnahass et al., 2019).
This suggests that busy BODs are likely to make their banks more at-
tractive under the eyes of the debtholders, resulting in lower borrowing
costs.
We also use interaction terms between busy BODs and IB dummy
variable (i.e. ABOD*ISLAMIC; %BBOD*ISLAMIC) to conduct compara-
tive analyses between IBs and CBs for the impact of busy outside di-
rectors on bank cost of debt; our second hypothesis. Results generally
show that busy BOD, across two alternative metrics (ABOD, %BBOD),
has a significantly higher agency cost of debt in IB system than their
conventional counterparts. This is presented by the highly significant
and positive coefficients of interaction terms in both models. This is in
line with our expectations and our second hypothesis that CBs having
busy BOD is likely to have a lower cost of debt than IBs having busy
BOD.9 According to the magnitudes of the estimates of both interaction
terms, it is possible for Islamic banks to still benefit from the busy
boards for lower cost of debts. However, the reduced levels are lowered
by approximately 50% (that results in coefficient equal to ‐0.195)
comparing to those of conventional banks (‐0.353) for ABOD. The
Table 4
Correlation matrix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. ABOD 1
2. %BBOD 0.813* 1
3. LogBSIZE 0.128* 0.191* 1
4. %IND 0.165* 0.201* −0.403* 1
5. DUAL 0.078 0.064 0.060 −0.035 1
6. LogTA −0.038 0.005 −0.039 0.218* 0.042 1
7. LEV −0.080 −0.053 0.153* −0.170* 0.050 0.042 1
8. GDPCAPITA 0.064 0.109* −0.153* 0.260* −0.070 0.478* −0.449* 1
9. HHI 0.022 0.011 −0.024 −0.115* 0.019 0.071 −0.115* 0.146* 1
10. GOV_COUNTRY 0.112* 0.127* −0.144* 0.323* −0.099 0.430* −0.489* 0.630* 0.074 1
11. ISLAMIC −0.072 −0.097 0.233* −0.071 −0.160* −0.111* 0.052 −0.001 0.144* −0.063 1
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among main independent variables used in our main analysis for full subsample. * indicates
significance at the 5% level. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
Table 5
Cost of debt and board of directors' busyness
Variables (1) (2)





























Year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 386 386
R-squared 0.600 0.581
The table presents OLS regression results identifying the effect of busy boards of
directors on a bank’s cost of debt. Robust standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust P-values in
parentheses. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
*** In unreported tests, we run tests for the IB subsample separately by in-
cluding size of Shari'ah board and multiple directorships of Shari'ah board. The
findings are still consistent to our main results.
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finding implies that bank debtholders tend to be more concern about
the busyness effect (e.g. lax attention, time and efforts) in IBs than that
in CBs due to the higher complication of IBs in terms of agency re-
lationships and institutional environments.
The signs of other control variables are consistent with previous
literature. For example, board size (LogBSIZE) is significantly and ne-
gatively related to the cost of debt, which suggests that banks having
large BOD are likely to reduce the firm cost of debt. This is in line with
previous studies of Lorca et al. (2011), Fields et al. (2012) and
Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017) showing that larger board is ne-
gatively associated with firm borrowing rates. Results of board in-
dependence indicate that a high presentation of outside directors in
boards is likely to increase the bank cost of debt significantly. This can
be explained that banks with higher board independence tend to reduce
the firm performance (Pathan & Faff, 2013; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter,
2012; Yermack, 1996) and thus, the debtholders may require higher
premium from their lending.
5.2. Trend analysis: bank cost of debt by the interval categories of board
busyness
We next follow the study of Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017) to
provide a trend analysis of a bank average cost of debt for every in-
cremental change in BOD busyness variable. We indeed partition our
board busyness proxy into equal increments and investigating how the
cost of debt change with each increasing increment category.
Table 6a (Panel A) reveal that we have split %BBOD (i.e. the per-
centage of busy outside directors serving on the BOD) into 10% segment
Table 6a
Trend analysis: Bank cost of debt by the interval categories of board of directors’ busyness
Panel A
% busy outside directors
Intervals < 10% 10‐19% 20‐29% 30‐39% 40‐49% 50‐59% 60‐69% 70‐79% 80‐89% 90‐99% 100%
N 117 1 15 17 8 62 41 38 7 0 80
% 30.3% 0.3% 3.9% 4.4% 2.1% 16.1% 10.6% 9.8% 1.8% 0 20.7%
Cost of debt 2.842 0.659 0.313 0.096 0.089 0.010 1.916 2.790 3.267 ‐ 3.388
Panel B
Average number of outside directorships hold by outside directors
Intervals < 1 1‐1.99 2‐2.99 3‐3.99 4‐4.99 5‐5.99 6‐6.99 7‐7.99 8‐8.99 9‐9.99 > 9.99
N 109 89 57 57 25 22 14 9 1 1 2
% 28.2% 23.1% 14.8% 14.8% 6.5% 5.7% 3.6% 2.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
Cost of debt 3.385 2.562 1.744 1.620 1.445 1.202 1.187 0.917 0.243 0.579 1.902
The table presents trend analysis results identifying a bank’s cost of debt for every incremental change in board busyness proxy measures.
Table 6b
Possible Non-linear Relationship between Cost of Debt and Board of Directors’ Busyness
Variables Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Conventional banks Panel C: Islamic banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ABOD ‐0.551*** ‐0.768*** ‐0.028
(0.000) (0.000) (0.883)
(ABOD)2 0.035** 0.057*** ‐0.006
(0.019) (0.002) (0.820)
%BBOD ‐2.402*** ‐4.312*** ‐0.031
(0.010) (0.000) (0.981)
(%BBOD)2 1.067 2.711** ‐0.326
(0.217) (0.019) (0.794)
LogBSIZE ‐2.492*** ‐2.555*** ‐2.055*** ‐2.282*** ‐2.338*** ‐2.297***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%IND 2.340*** 2.220*** 4.126*** 4.409*** ‐0.341 ‐0.362
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.522) (0.516)
DUAL ‐2.065*** ‐2.109*** ‐2.002*** ‐2.009*** ‐ ‐
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LogTA 0.566*** 0.587*** 0.587*** 0.605*** 0.455*** 0.450***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEV ‐0.076*** ‐0.067** ‐0.187*** ‐0.208*** ‐0.011 ‐0.008
(0.010) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.731) (0.806)
GDPCAPITA ‐1.192*** ‐1.183*** ‐1.314*** ‐1.272*** ‐0.869*** ‐0.840***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
HHI ‐3.662*** ‐3.782*** ‐5.101*** ‐5.413*** ‐2.417** ‐2.440***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.009)
GOV_COUNTRY 1.625*** 1.577*** 1.429*** 0.987* 1.579** 1.493**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.053) (0.036) (0.024)
ISLAMIC ‐0.840*** ‐0.840***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 11.800*** 11.361*** 12.437*** 12.103*** 8.748*** 8.450***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 386 386 236 236 150 150
Adjusted R2 0.602 0.580 0.658 0.640 0.394 0.394
The table presents OLS regression results for the full sample (Panel A), conventional bank subsample (Panel B) and Islamic bank subsample (Panel C) identifying the
possible non-linear effect of busy board of directors on a bank’s cost of debt. Robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, *
p< 0.1. Robust P-values in parentheses.
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categories: below 10%, 10‐19.99%, 20‐29.99%, etc. Results show that
at lower board busyness interval (up to 59.99%), the average cost of
debt reduces as the percentage of busy outside directors increases.
However, an opposite result is found when the busyness interval ex-
ceeds 59.99%.
Similarly, Table 6a (Panel B) provide findings on how the bank cost
of debt is influenced when a bank adds an additional average outside
directorships to the BOD. We explore that with every incremental ad-
dition of an average outside directorship to the BOD, the bank cost of
debt decreases. However, the cost of debt slightly increases when the
average outside directorships exceeds 8.99.
These findings are in accord with prior studies in non-financial firms
(e.g., Chakravarty & Rutherford, 2017) and in line with our main re-
sults.
5.3. The possible non-linear effect of busy boards of directors on bank cost
of debt
We continue testing the possible non-linear effect of busy BOD on
bank cost of debt between three subsamples: full sample, CBs and IBs
subsample. We find for full sample and CBs subsample that, in Table 6b
(Panels A and B, respectively), busy BOD is significantly related to a
reduction in bank cost of debt. However, the sign directions of the
square of board busyness, i.e. (ABOD)2 and (%BBOD)2 are reversed,
implying a non-linear association between busy BOD and the bank cost
of debt. This is consistent with the main result in Table 5 and the trend
analysis in Section 5.2. We find no significant evidence for the effect of
busy BOD on cost of debt in IBs. This finding, again, confirms our
second hypothesis that CBs with busy BODs have a lower cost of debt
than IBs with busy BODs.
5.4. Agency relationships, busy board of directors and the cost of debt
Trinh et al. (2019) argue that the agency problem of a bank could be
affected by busy BOD through its functions of scrutinising, either po-
sitive or negative. We, hence, examine whether agency costs have any
impacts on the main result related to board busyness-cost of debt nexus.
In Models 1 and 2 of Table 7, we report the results about the effect
of agency costs (i.e. cash to total assets) on the relationship between
busy BOD and bank cost of debt. We find that holding more cash in CBs
appears not to show any significant influence on the negative nexus
between busy BOD and the borrowing rates. Meanwhile, holding higher
cash level in IBs tends to increase such type of costs, which can be
explained that debtholders in this bank type seem not to have trust in
the ability of busy outside directors in monitoring the cash use of
managers. The findings are consistent with the study of Elnahass et al.
(2019) showing that busy BODs in IBs are related to higher agency
conflicts.
6. Additional Testing and robustness checks
6.1. Effects of busy boards on cost of debt after controlling for additional
control variables
In this section, we test whether our main results in Table 5 are
sensitive to changes in the components of control variables. We add
additional independent variables related to corporate governance
characteristics comprising of the qualifications of outside directors (i.e.
%INDQ), the percentage of outside directors with financial expertise
(i.e. %INDEXP). The size of audit committee in natural logarithm form
(i.e. LogASIZE) the percentage of busy directors serving in audit com-
mittee (i.e. %BAC), and the average number of board meeting held by
outside directors (i.e. INDMET). We find in Table 8 that the main
findings remain unchanged, implying that our stories are robust when
adding more control variables.
6.2. Alternative measures of Cost of Debts
For more robustness check, we use alternative measures for cost of
debts. In details, we use the interest rate on the banks’ debt (i.e.,
Interest), which is computed as the interest expense for the year divided
by the interest-bearing debt (Bliss & Gul, 2012; Francis, Khurana, &
Pereira, 2005), as a measure of cost of debt for CBs subsample. How-
ever, for the IB subsample, we used the return on IAHs (i.e., Return)10
as an alternative proxy for its cost of debt because IBs are interest-free
businesses. We derived these data from DataStream, Osiris and
Bloomberg. Table 9 provides the results of these tests. Our results are
generally in line with our main baseline results. Therefore, we believe
that our findings are robust across different proxies for cost of debt.
6.3. Board endogeneity treatments
As with other studies on BOD characteristics (e.g., Chakravarty &
Rutherford, 2017; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015), our research is no exempt
Table 7
Cost of debt and board of directors’ busyness: The effect of agency costs
Variables (1) (2)



































Year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 386 386
R-squared 0.625 0.608
The table presents OLS regression results identifying the effect of agency costs
on the relationship between busy boards of directors on a bank’s cost of debt.
Robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p< 0.1. Robust P-values in parentheses. See Table 2 for variable
definitions.
††† We aware of limitation of using this proxy for the cost of debt in IBs.
However, in IBs, IAHs play an important role in providing capital to the banks;
therefore, higher return for IAHs may imply higher cost of capital or equivalent
to higher cost of debt.
V.Q. Trinh, et al. International Review of Financial Analysis 69 (2020) 101472
9
from the potential endogeneity issues.11 We, therefore, perform several
methods to control for this problem. We first employ the one-year lag of
all independent variables (Table 10) and re-test them under OLS with
robust standard errors.
We next perform Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) (Table 10: Panel A)
and Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) (Table 11: Panel B) to reduce en-
dogeneity between busy BOD and the bank cost of debt. Given that the
focus of this study is on board busyness, we seek for good exogenous in-
strumental variable (IVs) for this main variable that is correlated with the
suspected endogenous variable, but uncorrelated with the error terms of
the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2009). We followed the design of
Elnahass et al. (2019) and Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) to choose IVs which
include the number of public firms headquartered in the same country of
the bank and the country-level income-generating category12 (recorded in
World Bank). For the first IV, we argue that directors of the banks head-
quartered in countries with more public companies are more likely to find
additional jobs in other firms; hence, the number of outside directorships
is predicted to be positively related to the number of public firms head-
quartered in the same country. For the second IV, we contend that a more
developed economic system with high-income levels tends to feature
skilled and high-paid jobs for directors (World Bank, 2016); thereby, we
anticipate a higher number of outside directorships hold by directors in
Table 8
Sensitivity test: Adding more corporate governance variables
Variables (1) (2)







































Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 310 310
R-squared 0.653 0.641
The table presents OLS regression results identifying the effect of busy board of
directors and other corporate governance variables on a bank’s cost of debt.
Robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. *** p< 0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust P-values in parentheses. See Table 2 and Section 6.1
for variable definitions.
Table 9
Alternative measures for Cost of Debt
Variables Panel A: Conventional banks Panel B: Islamic banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Constant 1.432*** 0.843*** 5.067** 3.452*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.052)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 236 236 150 150
R-squared 0.321 0.344 0.123 0.156
The table presents OLS regression results using alternative measures for cost of
debt. Robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. *** p<0.01,
** p< 0.05, * p<0.1. Robust P-values in parentheses. See Table 2 for variable
definitions.
Table 10
Endogeneity Treatment: Using one-year lag of independent variables
Variables (1) (2)





























Year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 316 316
R-squared 0.603 0.588
The table presents OLS regression results identifying the effect of busy board of
directors on a bank’s cost of debt. Robust standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Robust P-values in
parentheses. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
‡‡‡ Wu-Durbin-Hausmann statistics show an existence of endogeneity of board
busyness measures.
§§§ It is measured as a dummy variable taking value of one if the “home” bank
is in a country classified as a middle and high-income generating nation, and 0
otherwise. See more in Trinh et al. (2019).
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banks located in high-income countries. These two IVs are expected to
affect board busyness measure, but are uncorrelated with the error term in
the main equations.13 More specifically, they are correlated with possible
endogenous variables (BOD busyness), and should only predict bank cost
of debt indirectly through their impacts on endogenous variables (see
Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Elnahass et al., 2019). For our estimated
sample, we argue that these IVs employed in our study can indirectly in-
fluence bank cost of debt since the country-level indicators are less likely
to affect individual banks’ cost of debt endogenously. This is confirmed by
two diagnostic tests, (i) The Sargan test (misspecification test with the null
hypothesis of no misspecification) and (ii) the Breusch and Pagan LM test
(to examine whether cross-equation disturbances are truly associated and
if the equations need to be tested simultaneously). We treat either busy
BOD or bank cost of debt as endogenous variables and construct si-
multaneous equations models, Eqs (2) and (3). In the first equation, Eq (2),
we estimate the effect of busy directors on bank cost of debt; and in the
second equation, Eq. (3), we estimate the impact of such cost of debt on
the busy BOD.
Next, we use a two-step system Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) (Table 11, Panel C) estimator, which controls for the un-
observed impacts through the transformation of the variables into first
differences to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable
bias (Arellano & Bover, 1995). GMM procedures employ lagged values
as IVs for the endogenous variables such as board busyness (see Mollah
et al., 2017; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). The logic is that these factors in
earlier years could not have resulted from bank cost of debt in sub-
sequent years; hence, endogeneity problem is unlikely.
Finally, we employ propensity score matching (PSM) estimation
(Elnahass et al., 2019; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) as a test of sample
selection bias and possible endogeneity for board busyness variable.
Table 11
Robustness check: Endogeneity treatment by two-stage least square, Three-stage least square and GMM
Variables Panel A: 2SLS Panel B: 3SLS Panel C: GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cost of Debt Cost of Debt Cost of Debt Cost of Debt Cost of Debt Cost of Debt
ABOD ‐1.910*** ‐2.061*** ‐0.225***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.002)
ABOD*ISLAMIC 1.711*** 1.865*** 0.195**
(0.009) (0.000) (0.038)
%BBOD ‐13.444*** ‐14.803*** ‐1.520***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
%BBOD*ISLAMIC 11.782*** 13.016*** 1.454**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.041)
LogBSIZE ‐1.090 0.551 ‐0.914 0.952 ‐0.946** ‐1.031
(0.271) (0.656) (0.178) (0.437) (0.017) (0.224)
%IND 2.073** 4.055*** 2.095*** 4.319*** ‐0.497 0.533
(0.025) (0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.442) (0.593)
DUAL ‐0.941 ‐1.197 ‐0.819 ‐1.059 ‐0.373 0.183
(0.476) (0.331) (0.336) (0.306) (0.336) (0.888)
LogTA 0.345** 0.253 0.347** 0.248 0.275* 0.294
(0.021) (0.206) (0.033) (0.253) (0.065) (0.257)
LEV ‐0.048 ‐0.082* ‐0.043 ‐0.080 ‐0.021 ‐0.027
(0.204) (0.096) (0.378) (0.190) (0.561) (0.658)
GDPCAPITA ‐1.675*** ‐1.237*** ‐1.678*** ‐1.188*** ‐0.477*** ‐0.394*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.093)
HHI 0.774 2.114 0.486 1.678 ‐1.582*** ‐1.196**
(0.732) (0.415) (0.823) (0.566) (0.000) (0.017)
GOV_COUNTRY 3.638*** 2.734*** 3.721*** 2.729*** 0.988** 0.700
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.012) (0.213)
ISLAMIC ‐5.119*** ‐7.458*** ‐5.495*** ‐8.140*** ‐0.568* ‐0.867**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) (0.033)
Constant 19.630*** 15.042*** 20.066*** 15.056*** 3.347* 3.719
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.238)
Cost of Debtt−1 0.786*** 0.766***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Model 2SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS GMM GMM
Observations 386 386 386 386 316 316
Wald 2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Over identification (p-value) 0.009 0.100
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.122 0.344
Breusch-Pagan LM test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000
AR(2) p-value 0.440 0.320
Hansen test (p-value) 0.202 0.328
The table presents 2SLS and 3SLS and GMM regression results identifying the effect of busy board of directors and other corporate governance variables on a bank’s
cost of debt. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p< 0.1. Robust P-values in parentheses. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
**** With the purpose of checking the results sensitivities, we use alternative
IV. Specifically, we take the year-average of the board busyness variable of
other banks in the same country for our sample as IV. This method of in-
strumenting has been tested and verified by previous literature (e.g. Anginer,
Demirguc-Kunt, & Zhu, 2014; John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008; Laeven & Levine,
2009; Safiullah & Shamsuddin, 2019). After using this instrument, the results
suggest that the cost of debt variation is less likely to associate with board
busyness in the other banks. Therefore, we can argue that this instrument is
very likely to be correlated with the endogenous variable (board busyness) and
at the same time be less likely to correlate with unobserved factors that affect
dependent variables (i.e. cost of debts).
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Three-step process is therefore as follows. Firstly, we employ probit
technique to estimate propensity scores for banks having board with
busy outside directors (treatment group) and those having board
without busy outside directors (control group). Secondly, after ob-
taining estimated propensity scores of treated and controlled groups,
we then continue matching samples using four alternative methods:
one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with and without replacement
that the unit chosen from male directors observations, and nearest
neighbour matching with n=2 and n=3 with replacement. Using these
techniques can match each observation of treatment group with each
observation of control group. The quality of matching is confirmed in
appendix 1 demonstrating the distribution of the propensity score be-
fore and after matching. Finally, we proceed to examine the average
effects of board busyness on cost of debt through regressions on the
matched samples only. Table 12 shows univariate (Panel A and B) and
multivariate results (Panel C) for full sample. The former (i.e., average
treatment effects in Panel A; average treatment effects on the treated
estimation with bootstrapping of standard errors (i.e. 100, 1000, 10000
replications) in Panel B) indicates that cost of debt is lower for treat-
ment group, or lower for banks having board with busy outside direc-
tors than their counterparts having board without busy outside direc-
tors. This is consistent across all employed matching techniques. The
latter (i.e., regression results) shows negative and significant
coefficients across all regressions 1‐4. This suggests a negative re-
lationship between board busyness and cost of debt for matched
sample14, which is in line with our main results presented in Table 5.15
Results obtained from all above endogenous treatment approaches
(Lags form; GMM; 2SLS; and 3SLS; PSM) are reported in Table 10-12
(Panel A, B and C) confirm that our main results are robust and survive
across different model specifications.16
7. Summary and conclusion
The main purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board
Table 12
Propensity score matching method: The effect of board busyness on the cost of debt (Full sample)
Estimator: propensity-score matching
Treatment model: probit
Dependent variable: cost of debt
Panel A: Average treatment effects with nearest neighbour Matching method
Treated Control Δ S.E. T-stat
1:1 matching without
replacement
Unmatched 1.671 3.211 ‐1.539*** 0.252 ‐6.11
Matched 1.954 3.211 ‐1.256*** 0.304 ‐4.14
1:1 matching with
replacement
Unmatched 1.671 3.211 ‐1.539*** 0.252 ‐6.11
Matched 1.679 3.245 ‐1.566*** 0.502 ‐3.12
Nearest neighbour (n=2) Unmatched 1.671 3.211 ‐1.539*** 0.252 ‐6.11
Matched 1.679 2.847 ‐1.168** 0.414 ‐2.82
Nearest neighbour (n=3) Unmatched 1.671 3.211 ‐1.539*** 0.252 ‐6.11
Matched 1.679 2.935 ‐1.257*** 0.399 ‐3.15
Panel B: Average treatment effect on the treated with 1:1 nearest neighbour matching and bootstrapping of standard errors
No of
obs.
Replications Observed (Δ) Bias S.E. T-stat
388 100 ‐1.548*** 0.185 0.369 ‐4.19
388 1000 ‐1.548*** 0.209 0.342 ‐4.53
388 10000 ‐1.548*** 0.211 0.342 ‐4.53
Panel C: Regressions on matched samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables 1:1 matching without
replacement





















Adjusted R-squared 0.588 0.579 0.520 0.541
Observations 306 464 344 356
Note: The table present the propensity score matching technique showing the results of the average treatment effects (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) with 1:1 nearest neighbour matching and bootstrapping of standard errors. The ATE and ATT of board busyness on the cost of debt (Δ) is estimated as
the difference between the mean changes of banks having board with busy outside directors (column “Treated”) and that of matched banks having board without
busy outside directors (column “Non-treated”). P-value is presented in parentheses. T-statistics based on standard errors are presented in final column. *** p< 0.01,
** p<0.05, * p< 0.1.
†††† In unreported tests, we separate full sample into two subsamples of IBs
and CBs, and then estimate PSM. We consistently find significantly negative
effect of board busyness on cost of debt in CBs subsample, yet that finding is
insignificant in IBs. This is in line with our results for each sub sample found in
Table 6b. Tables are available upon request.
‡‡‡‡ For our estimated period, there was no major regulatory requirements
introduction related to board independence (Aljughaiman & Salama, 2019). We
hence do not use difference-in-difference (DiD) type setting.
§§§§ Unreported tests perform the propensity-score matching method. The
results are consistent with the findings in main tests. Tables are provided upon
request.
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busyness on a bank’s cost of debt within mixed banking system (Islamic
and Conventional). Extant literature shows competing findings on the
role of busy directors play in corporate performance. Yet no studies
have been conducted on investigating the link between busy directors
and bank cost of debt financing. Besides, using two global banking
systems (Islamic and Conventional) as the setting, we examine the ef-
fect that busyness of board of directors has on a bank’s cost of debt.
We first compliment the Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017) study
by investigating the linkage between board busyness and the firm
borrowing rates for the cross-country banking sample. Based on this
analysis, we find that board busyness has an inverse association with
the bank cost of debt financing. Therefore, the higher the board busy-
ness, the lower the firm cost of debt. While establishing the negative
relationship between board busyness and the cost of debt for the whole
sample, we also compare and contrast such relation between two bank
types with different governance mechanisms: one-layer (conventional
banks) and two-layer (Islamic banks). We find that conventional banks
having busy directors are more likely to enjoy the low cost of debt than
Islamic banks having busy directors. Furthermore, we find a non-linear
effect of busy boards on borrowing rates in conventional banks, but not
in their Islamic counterparts.
In this study, we extend the existing body of research on busy board
of directors. Contrary to prevalent wisdom that board busyness tends to
be detrimental to firm performance/value, we indicate that busy board
can also provide a source of economic value to their respective banks
and, hence, lowering the borrowing rate for their respective banks. By
taking a modest step toward a more comprehensive understanding of
busy outside directors for different banking models, we expect business
practitioners, regulators and academics to gain a deeper understanding
on how to balance the positive and negative attributes of board busy-
ness as it associates with bank financing costs.
*This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in
the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Declarations of competing interest
None
Appendix 1. Distribution of the Propensity Score of treated and non-treated before and after matching
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